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TAXATION 
JOSEPH CURTIS* 
No tax legislation of general interest was enacted by the General Assembly 
at its Extra Session in September 1956. An addition to the property tax 
exempt organizations,! a revenue license exemption for certain alien interns,2 
and some changes in the extension ot time allowed countic., for completing 
reassessments3 comprised the total enactments in the tax field. 
Tax cases decided by the courts were few in number during the period 
covered by this Survey. Although none were startling in the sense of 
setting forth significant innovations in Virginia tax law, some involved 
particularly interesting phases of subject matter treated by the courts dur-
ing the previous two years, and foreshadow a likelihood of much additional 
future contro'Y'ersy centering around those matters. 
AssESSMENTS L" NAME oF PmoR OwNER 
The Supreme Court of Appeals has held that an inaccuracy in the de-
scription of property conveyed by deed does not relieve a commissioner of 
his duty to transfer the property on the land books to the grantee,4 and 
thereafter assess in the name of the grantee, where such inaccuracy would 
readily become apparent upon the required check of the list of deeds5 
furnished him by the clerk of the court against the records in the clerk's 
office. In Jennings v. Norfolk6 taxes on the property had been assessed in 
the grantor's name for three years before and extending through eighteen 
years after the execution and recordation of the deed to the grantee. The 
land was eventually sold to the city pursuant to a decree in a suit to enforce 
its ta.x lien. Plaintiffs, claiming title through the grantee, sought to have 
the deed to the city declared null and void as a cloud on their title. Despite 
its inaccuracy in part, the Court found that the description in the deed was 
adequate to identify the property, and that its proper description was de-
terminable upon examination of the records in the clerk's office. Finding 
that the subsequent assessments in the grantor's name were therefore er-
roneous, the Court decided that the taxes for the eighteen years constituted 
• Professor of Law, William and Mary. Member, Virginia and New York bars. 
B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M. 1948, New York University. 
I. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 58-12 (Add. Supp. 1956). 
2. ld. § 58-387.1. 
3. Id. § 58-792.1. 
4. VA. CoDE ANN.§ 58-803 (1950). 
5. Id. § 58-797. 
6. 198 Va. 277, 93 S.E.2d 302 (1956). 
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no enforceable lien against the land. With respect to the city's lien for 
taxes assessed in open years prior to the conveyance, the Court said that 
the proceeding for the enforcement of that lien was void as to the grantee 
and her assigns, as they were necessary parties to that suit and not properly 
brought in through service by publication under the designation of "Parties 
Unknown." 
The decision does not state how much further a commissioner must go 
than merely compare the list of deeds furnished him by _the clerk against 
the deed recorded in the clerk's office in order to "carefully check the 
same" as required by the statute. The city maintained that he is required 
only to check the list against the deed, and the Court agreed to the extent 
that his duty is certainly no less than that. While not forthrightly stating 
that it is any greater, the Court's finding that the deed was sufficient to 
apprise the commissioner of the identification of the property rested on 
what the commissioner would have learned had he resorted to the map book 
referred to in the deed. This is, of course, no indication that the com-
missioner will be obliged to conduct something akin to a title search in 
order properly to assess a real property tax and give validity to a tax lien 
for its nonpayment, but the required "check" would seem to call for more 
than a cursory comparison. 
TAX SITUS OF TANGIDLE CHATTELS 
The decreasing weight of the mobilia sequuntur personam doctrine in the 
determination of the situs of tangible property has long been acknowledged 
by the courts, both federal and state. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking 
for the United States' Supreme Court in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox,1 
stated, 
In the case of tangible property, the ancient maxim, which had its 
origin when personal property consisted in the main of articles ap-
pertaining to the person of the owner, yielded in modem times to the 
law of the place where the property is kept and used.8 
In Hogan v. County of N orfolk9 the doctrine yields in the construction of 
that section of the Virginia Code which provides that the situs for the taxa-
tion of tangible personal property shall be the county "in which such 
property may be physically located on the first day of the tax year." 1o 
That county was the County of Norfolk, whose assessments on defendant's 
7. 298 u.s. 193 (1936). 
8. ld. at 209-10. 
9. 198 Va. 733,96 S.E.2d 744 (1957). 
10. VA.CoDEANN.§58-834 (1950). 
1957] Annual Survey of Virginia Law 991 
ta..-ricabs were contested on the ground that the defendant was a resident of 
Portsmouth. In line with numerous decisions of the federal courts and 
other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals distinguished transitory or tem-
porary presence from presence of a more durable nature coupled with 
habitual use of the property in the taxing locale. Having no evidence be-
fore it that the County of Norfolk was not where the taxicabs "really be-
longed" in the ordinary course of defendant's business, the Court found 
that the presumptive validity of the assessments, arising by reason of the 
taxicabs' physical location, was not rebutted. In an earlier case, Newport 
News v. Commonwealth,11 the mobilia doctrine was held to preclude a tax 
by Newport News upon ferries physically present more in that city than 
in Norfolk, the home of the company. The Court in Hogan distinguished 
that case on the fact that the ferries were also "present'' in Norfolk and 
that their tax situs therefore remained in the home locale.12 
The decision makes it clear that the tro..-payer may well have to file more 
than one tangible property tax form if there is diversity between the 
county or city of his residence and that of the seat of his business activities, 
or if his activities in regard to the use of his tangible business assets extend be-
yond the confines of one county or city. The decision, however, infers 
no threat that more than one county or city will be permitted to tax the 
same property. 
DAIRYMAN's LICENSE TAX ExEMPTION 
Thompson's Dairy, a District of Columbia corporation with no plant or 
place of business in Virginia, sold its products not only to Virginia custom-
ers whose orders had been previously taken, but also directly- by its truck 
drivers in Virginia to any who wished to purchase them. In an earlier 
case an Arlington County license tax imposed upon it was held not to violate 
the commerce clause, as the direct sales were intrastate, nor to discriminate 
in favor of resident dairies, which, although free of the license tax, were 
taxed upon their capital employed in Virginia.13 In Thompson's Dairy, Inc. 
'V. Commonwealth14 the same contentions are again made, and briefly dis-
11. 165 Va. 635, 183 S.E. 514 (1936). 
12. Obviously the Supreme Court of Appeals is not as prone to allow more than one 
county tax upon property in construing the Virginia statute as is the United States 
Supreme Court to allow more than one unapportioned state tax with regard to the 
commerce and due process clauses of the Federal Constitution. See Northwest Air-
lines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944), particularly Mr. Justice Jackson's con-
curring opinion. 
13. Thompson's Dairy, Inc. v. County Bd. of Arlington, 197 Va. 623, 90 S.E.2d 810 
(1956). See Sager, Taxation, ANN. SURVEY VA. LAw, 42 VA. L. REv. 1190, 1196 (1956); 
Ribble, Constitutional Law, id. at 1157, 1161. 
14. 198 Va. 411, 94 S.E.2d 243 (1956). 
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posed of by the Court by reference to its former answers to them. In the 
present case, however, the Dairy also contended that as a dairyman peddler 
of milk, butter, cream and eggs, it was exempt from license requirements, 
both state and municipal.15 Finding that the products sold also included 
chocolate mix, eggnog mix, fruit juices, cottage cheese and margarine, the 
Court refused to give "mill{, butter, cream and eggs" the broad connotation 
of dairy products in general and held the · exempting clause inapplicable. 
The literal construction seems particularly justifiable in the view that when 
the legislature intended to encompass other than specifically named products 
in clauses of the same code section concerning self-grown products, it did 
so in the uhmistakeable terms of "other family supplies of a perishable 
nature." 16 
RESIDENT APPOINTMENT oF NoNRESIDENT INTANGIBLES 
Virginia Code Section 58-152 renders only such property as is ''within 
the jurisdiction of this commonwealth" subject to inheritance tax. In 
March, 1955, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that a settlor of an ir-
revocable nonresident trust, who subsequently became a resident of Vir-
ginia, did not bring the intangible corpus of the trust into Virginia's juris-
diction along with his person solely by reason of the life interest that he 
had reserved while a nonresident.17 Citing this precedent and with like ap-
proach, Judge Hening of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond has 
determined that the do_nee of a power of appointment, who subsequently 
becomes a Virginia resident, does not thereby bring the appointive property 
within the jurisdiction of the commonwealth.18 The appointive property 
was intangibles of a New York trust established by a· New York settlor. 
The donee of the power subsequently moved to Virginia and thereafter 
converted the general testamentary power to a special power19 which she 
15. VA. ConE ANN. § 58~340 (1950). The action was also against the City of Alex-
andria, with municipal exemption automatically dependent upon state exemption. ld. 
§ 58-344. 
16. Judge Doubles, Richmond Hustings Court, Part II, has recently determined that 
selling self-produced ice cream on sidewalks falls within the "family supplies of a 
perishable nature" exemption. Hendricks v. Richmond, In the Hustings Court of the 
City of Richmond, Part II, Chancery Order Book No. 38, p. 380, entered July 10, 1957. 
17. Commonwealth v. Morris, 196 Va. 868, 86 S.E.2d 135 (1955). 
18. Davis v. Commonwealth, In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Order 
Book No. 66, p. 297, entered July 17, 1957. 
19. There was no creation of a class of potential appointees as the term "special 
power" might indicate. Here the donee restricted the general power by releasing all 
rights to appoint the principal of the trUst to herself, her estate, her creditors or the 
creditors of her estate. 
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exercised by her will in favor of a Virginia appointee. Property law con-
cepts, such as a power to appoint property is not an interest in the prop-
erty and the appointee takes from the donor and not from the donee of the 
power, are infused into Judge Hening's opinion to support a finding of Vir-
ginia's lack of jurisdiction over the appointive property and not to assert 
that appointive property is not taxable upon the donee's exercise of the 
power.2° It would seem, however, that the "niceties" of property law will 
continue to pervade Virginia's judicial tax thinking. at least until many of 
the doubts raised in the wake of the Carter case21 are resolved.22 
20. In Commonwealth v. Caner, 198 Va. 141, 92 S.E.2d 369 (1956), the donee's ex-
ercise of the power was held to be a taxable event, but the appointive property was 
not to be coupled with the donee's own property, although both passed to the same 
recipient, in determining the applicable rate bracket. In that case the donor was a 
Virginia resident, but at the time of his death in 1888, when the power was created, no 
inheritance ta....: was assessable against the beneficiaries of his will. The decision does 
not clearly indicate of what consequence was the fact that no inheritance tax was assess-
able at the donor's death and therefore whether, in any event, VA. ConE ANN. § 58-173 
(Supp. 1956) might operate so as to impose but one tax from donor to appointee. 
21. See note 20 supra. 
22. For a particularly outstanding example of a coun's hurdling of staid property 
law concepts, see Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940), where the "niceties of the 
an of conveyancing" give way to "eminently practical" tax considerations. 
